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INTRODUCTION
Economic theory can be a useful tool for courts applying the anti-
trust laws. Theory can tell courts what purposes contracts might serve
t Associate Professor of Law, William and Mary School of Law. A.B. 1986, College of
William and Mary; J.D. 1989, The University of Chicago. A research grant from the Wil-
liam and Mary School of Law supported this project. Thomas Arthur, Neal Devins, Jack
Goldsmith, James Hamilton, Charles Koch, Lawrence Lessig, Taylor Reveley, and Cynthia
Ward provided helpful comments. Jeanne Gordon and Della Harris assisted in prepara-
tion of the manuscript.
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
and what effects they will have on consumers and others. Does a con-
tract increase prices? Create wealth? Both? Economic theory can
help judges answer these and other questions. It is little wonder,
then, that implicitly or explicitly, economics has played an important
role in the development of antitrust doctrine since Congress passed
the Sherman Act over a century ago.'
Economics, however, is not a static science. Contracts that once
seemed to harm consumers, for instance, may now appear innocuous
or even beneficial. Yet the mere fact that the economist's evaluation
of a practice has changed radically does not necessarily require a con-
comitant change in antitrust doctrine. While economic theory can
perform a descriptive function, explaining what purposes or effects
various contracts might have, economics cannot tell judges what pur-
poses or effects matter under the antitrust laws.2 That question, in-
stead, is a purely normative one that courts must answer by invoking
their best reading of these statutes. Moreover, economic theory does
not limit the range of answers to this normative question. Contracts
that economists view with indifference or approval can have social or
political consequences that Congress may have meant to remedy
through antitrust regulation-even, perhaps, at the expense of con-
sumers or efficiency. To be sure, economics can help courts illumi-
nate the nature and extent of the trade off between, for example, the
deconcentration of economic power and lower prices. Economics
cannot, however, determine whether this much deconcentration is
worth that much consumer welfare or whether such a trade off is ap-
propriate in the first place.
While the boundaries between the descriptive and the normative
are theoretically clear, courts do not always respect them in practice.
One such instance of failure to respect those boundaries prompts this
essay: the Supreme Court's recent opinion in State Oil Co. v. Khan.3 In
Khan, the Court reconsidered its decision in Albrecht v. Herald Co., 4
which had declared maximum resale price maintenance ("maximum
rpm") per se unlawful under the Sherman Act.5 Relying upon ad-
vances in economic theory which suggested that maximum rpm likely
1 See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRIsE AND AMERICAN LAW, 1836-1937, at 268 (1991)
("Antitrust policy has been forged by economic ideology since its inception."); Michael S.
Jacobs, An Essay on the Normative Foundations of Antitrust Economics, 74 N.C. L. REv. 219, 226
(1995) ("In almost every era of antitrust history, policymakers have employed economic
models to explain or modify the state of the law and the rationale for its enforcement.").
2 See MILTON FRIEDMAN, The Methodology of Positive Economics, in EssAys IN PosmvE
ECONOMICS 3, 3-7 (1953). See generally Herbert Hovenkamp, Positivism in Law &Economics,
78 CAL. L. REV. 815 (1990) (contending that welfare economics cannot dictate legal results
without additional normative arguments).
3 118 S. Ct. 275 (1997).
4 390 U.S. 145 (1968).
5 See id. at 151-54.
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may enhance the welfare of consumers, the Khan Court asserted that
Albrecht rested upon economic premises that have been discredited. 6
As shown below, Khan's repudiation of Albrecht cannot be justified
as a ministerial application of economic theory. Albrecht did not de-
pend upon any particular account of the purely economic effects of
maximum rpm. Instead, the decision was based upon a conclusion
that the practice interfered with the discretion of dealers to price as
they saw fit and thus offended "trader freedom," a value the Court
long had held worthy of protection under the antitrust laws. Khan's
determination that maximum rpm is more beneficial than Albrecht
might have supposed further highlights the trade off between the pro-
tection of dealers and the welfare of consumers; however, it does not
ipsofacto establish that Albrecht was wrongly decided. Rather, Khan im-
plicitly rests upon the repudiation of Albrecht's normative vision of an-
titrust and the substitution of an alternative vision that sees no
independent role for "trader freedom" in the development of anti-
trust doctrine.
Khan's failure to address squarely the normative basis for its con-
sumer-friendly decision is nothing new. For over two decades, the
Supreme Court fastidiously has declined to articulate a vision of what
the antitrust laws were designed to accomplish, all the while develop-
ing a jurisprudence that is increasingly solicitous of consumers and
indifferent to trader freedom. In so doing, the Court has narrowed or
overruled precedents that, like Albrecht, have rested upon
noneconomic values such as trader freedom. It has not, however, ex-
plicitly questioned the normative basis for these prior decisions, but
instead has employed revised economic theory to discredit them. In-
deed in some instances, the Court actually has left intact certain deci-
sions that rest on trader freedom, albeit in narrowed form.
Supporters and opponents alike may see Khan as one more step
in an inexorable and silent march toward an antitrust jurisprudence
that rests solely upon the welfare of consumers. More cynical observ-
ers may even see a disingenuous use of economic theory to shield a
less-than-candid abandonment of trader freedom, a value deeply en-
trenched in several decades of case law. Closer analysis, however,
reveals a different account of the Court's behavior and the role of
economic theory in its decision making. One can characterize Khan,
as well as the Court's approach to trader freedom generally, as an at-
tempt to minimize the institutional costs associated with the appear-
ance of politicized decision making in an environment in which the
normative foundations of antitrust are in serious dispute. Advances in
economic theory have made it clear that the protection of traders
6 See Khan, 118 S. Ct. at 284-85.
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often occurs at the expense of consumers. As a result, adherence to
decisions such as Albrecht would have required the Court to balance
the welfare of consumers against the social, moral, and political bene-
fits of trader freedom. Because there is no consensus that Congress
meant for courts to trade off consumer welfare against other values,
the pursuit of such balancing would appear incompatible with the ju-
dicial function. Thus, by repudiating Albrecht the Court avoided the
appearance of politicized decision making and safeguarded its own
legitimacy. Further, by characterizing its repudiation as an applica-
tion of changed economic theory, the Court avoided a direct chal-
lenge to Albrecht's normative vision and the accompanying costs of
questioning an approach to antitrust policy with significant preceden-
tial support.
This account of the Khan Court's behavior explains its reticence
to excise explicitly trader freedom from antitrust jurisprudence and
suggests that-at least in the short run-this value will continue to
play some role in antitrust doctrine. After all, not all trader freedom
precedents involve clear sacrifices in consumer welfare, even when
one takes advances in economic theory into account. Adherence to
such decisions, therefore, does not always entail the appearance of
political decision making of the sort that would have attended adher-
ence to Albrecht, some doctrines can protect traders without (appar-
ently) harming consumers. Repudiation of such decisions, then,
could not rest upon changes in economic theory but instead would
entail the high cost of questioning directly the normative premises of
the trader freedom era. Ironically, the Court's fastidious attention to
the appearance of principled decision making has produced an inco-
herent antitrust doctrine. Still, absent a new consensus regarding the
normative foundations of antitrust, the Court's equivocal approach to
trader freedom likely will continue.
I
TRADER FREEDOM'S UNCERTAIN STATUS IN THE
SUPREME COURT
For decades the Supreme Court looked outside economic theory
for the normative content of antitrust. In particular, the Court con-
sistently held that "trader freedom"-the autonomy of individuals and
small businesses-deserved independent significance under the anti-
trust laws. Group boycotts were deemed per se unlawful, even absent
any showing of anticompetitive effect, because they interfered with
the freedom of firms to compete in the marketplace. 7 Horizontal ter-
7 See Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212-14 (1959); Fashion
Originators' Guild of Am., Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 467-68 (1941).
766 [Vol. 84:763
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ritorial restraints ancillary to otherwise lawful joint ventures were un-
lawful because they limited the discretion of traders to determine
where they would operate.8 Tying contracts, which bound purchasers
to take one product in order to obtain another, were condemned be-
cause they deprived purchasers of the freedom to do business with the
vendor of their choice and denied vendors the correlative opportunity
to sell.9 Horizontal maximum price fixing-agreements that reduced
prices-were banned because they deprived parties to them of the
freedom to price as they saw fit.10 Mergers-even those that might
lead to lower prices-were viewed with hostility because they elimi-
nated independent competitors and threatened to drive smaller, less
efficient firms out of business." Congress, the Justices claimed, ex-
pressly had mandated the protection of trader freedom, even when
that protection came at the expense of consumers.' 2 Scholars during
this era generally agreed with this assessment of the law's scope.' 8
8 See United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972). In Topco the Court
noted:
Antitrust laws in general, and the Sherman Act in particular, are the Magna
Carta of free enterprise. They are as important to the preservation of eco-
nomic freedom and our free-enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to the
protection of our fundamental personal freedoms. And the freedom guaran-
teed each and every business, no matter how small, is the freedom to compete ....
Id. at 610 (emphasis added).
9 See Fortner Enters., Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 497-98, 503-04
(1969); HERBERT HoVENxAmp, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY. THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND
ITS PRACFIcE § 10.1, at 352 (1994) (concluding that the "main focus" of tying doctrine has
been "on interference with the freedom of dealers or other purchasers to make individual
business judgments"); Alan J. Meese, Tying Meets the New Institutional Economics: Farewell to
the Chimera of Forcing, 146 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 12-21 (1997); see also FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384
U.S. 316, 321 (1966) (voiding exclusive dealing contract because it "take[s] away freedom
of purchasers to buy in an open market" and thus offends "the central policy" of the anti-
trust laws).
1o See, e.g., Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram S& Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211, 213
(1951).
11 See United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 277-78 (1966) (declaring a
merger in an unconcentrated market unlawful); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S.
294, 344 (1962) (opining that efficiencies that may lead to lower prices also could militate
against a merger).
12 See Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 344; Klor's, 359 U.S. at 212; Fashion Originators' Guild, 312
U.S. at 467. Judge Learned Hand's articulation of the Sherman Act's purported concern
for trader freedom is typical:
We have been speaking only of the economic reasons which forbid monop-
oly; but ... there are others, based upon the belief that great industrial
consolidations are inherently undesirable, regardless of their economic re-
sults. In the debates in Congress Senator Sherman himself... showed that
among the purposes of Congress in 1890 was a desire to put an end to great
aggregations of capital because of the helplessness of the individual before
them.
United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 428 (2d Cir. 1945).
13 See, e.g., EARL W. KINTNER, AN AN-rrusT PRIMER at xiii-xiv (1964); LAWRENCE
ANTHONY SULLVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 10-13 (1977); Harlan M. Blake &
William K.Jones, In Defense of Antitrus4 65 COLUM. L. REv. 377, 383-84 (1965). There were,
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The Court did not ignore economic theory in developing its anti-
trust jurisprudence during this trader freedom era. To the contrary,
the Court's opinions almost always contained assertions about the eco-
nomic effects of the practices in question. 14 These assertions, never-
theless, usually appeared side-by-side with language regarding the
practices' impact on trader freedom, language that often appeared
dispositive. 15 Economics served a makeweight function, allowing the
Court to assert that its decisions, while enhancing the freedom of trad-
ers, also promoted the welfare of consumers. 16 Indeed, to the extent
that the Court was able to portray its decisions as favorable to consum-
ers, it minimized the appearance of preferring traders to consumers,
thus implying that little turned on the conclusion that trader freedom
was of independent significance. 17
Perhaps no decision better exemplifies the Court's solicitude for
trader freedom than Albrecht v. Herald Co.' s In Albrecht, the Court de-
termined that agreements setting maximum resale prices were unlaw-
ful per se because, among other things, they interfered with the
discretion of dealers to price their products as they saw fit.19 The ex-
ercise of this discretion, of course, could readily raise prices, to the
detriment of consumers. Thus, while the Court also invoked certain
economic evils that such contracts "might" produce, the categorical
ban on maximum rpm reflected a normative conception of antitrust
willing to subordinate the interests of consumers to those of dealers.
it should be noted, significant dissents from this view within the academy. See, e.g., Robert
H. Bork & Ward S. Bowman, Jr., The Crisis in Antitrus4 65 COLUM. L. REV. 363, 369-70
(1965). However, even the dissenters conceded that "most commentators on the topic"
agreed that antitrust had a social purpose that could override the welfare of consumers. Id.
at 369.
14 See HOVENAMP, supra note 9, § 2.2a, at 61 ("Even the relative aggressiveness of the
Warren Court era was grounded in economic theory, although antitrusters often pushed
the theory too far.").
15 See, e.g., Von's Grocey, 384 U.S. at 274-78 (voiding a merger that eliminated small
competitors and purportedly threatened a "trend toward concentration"); Kor's, 359 U.S.
at 213 (condemning group boycotts because they interfered with trader freedom and led
to "monopoly").
16 See Thomas E. Kauper, The "Warren Court" and the Antitrust Laws: Of Economics, Popu-
lism, and Cynicism, 67 MicH. L. REv. 325, 330 (1968) (suggesting that the Court "used eco-
nomic doctrine to support decisions arrived at upon other grounds"); id. at 332 (arguing
that the Court was primarily concerned with "equality of opportunity, free access to mar-
kets by competing sellers, and complete freedom of choice by buyers"); Frederick M.
Rowe, The Decline of Antitrust and the Delusions of Models: The Faustian Pact of Law and Econom-
ics, 72 GEo. L.J. 1511, 1524-27 (1984) (arguing that during the 1960s the Court employed
economic theory to justify decisions motivated by political and social concerns).
17 See Donald I. Baker & William Blumenthal, Ideological Cycles and Unstable Antitrust
Rules, 31 ANTrIRusr BuLL. 323, 330 (1986) (contending that during the trader freedom era
"[t] he precise objective of antitrust policy was unimportant, for populist and economic
approaches yielded consistent results").
18 390 U.S. 145 (1968).
19 See id at 152-53.
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Things changed, some thought, in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE
Sylvania Inc.20 In Sylvania, the Court reconsidered the per se ban on
agreements granting exclusive territories that it had announced just a
decade earlier in United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co.2 1 Relying upon
"new economics" regarding the virtues of such agreements, the Court
determined that Schwinn's per se rule lacked justification and that such
agreements should be analyzed on a case-by-case basis under the
"Rule of Reason."22 To the chagrin of some, however, the Court pro-
vided "virtually no guidance" on how to conduct the Rule of Reason
analysis.23
In a footnote, the Sylvania Court explicitly rejected the assertion
that concerns for dealer autonomy justified adherence to Schwinn's per
se rule.2 4 Schwinn, it claimed, did not purport to rest upon trader free-
dom, but instead upon the economic consequences of exclusive terri-
tories.25 Although the Court could have stopped there, it went on to
repudiate several decades of its stated antitrust policy, opining that
trader freedom should play no role in the development of antitrust
doctrine.26 The Court neither mentioned nor explicitly questioned
assertions in prior case law that one purpose of antitrust law was to
protect this autonomy. Nor did the Court claim that economic theory
itself justified the abandonment of trader freedom. Instead, it ob-
served that an antitrust policy concerned with this value, and not
"market considerations," would "lack any objective benchmarks."27
Scholars naturally have disagreed over the exact meaning of Syl-
vania's dictum for the normative content of antitrust. Some have ar-
gued that the decision signalled a wholesale abandonment of trader
freedom as a valid antitrust consideration and a substitution of an an-
titrust policy that rests solely upon solicitude for consumers.28 Others
20 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
21 388 U.S. 365, 381-82 (1967), overruled by Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.,
433 U.S. 36 (1977).
22 See Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 57-59.
23 Robert Pitofsky, The Sylvania Case: Antitrust Analysis of Non-Price Vertical Restrictions,
78 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 11 (1978).
24 See Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 53 n.21; see also id. at 67-70 (White, J., concurring in the
judgment) (noting that the majority "summarily reject[ed] th[e] concern ... for the au-
tonomy of independent businessmen" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
25 See id. at 53 n.21.
26 See id.
27 Id.
28 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Maximum Price Fixing, 48 U. CHI. L. RE:V. 886, 888
(1981) ("The Supreme Court has overruled Schwinn and explicitly rejected any analysis
that makes antitrust cases turn on the 'autonomy of independent businessmen.' Argu-
ments about the effect of a practice on quantity and price, not arguments about freedom
and autonomy, control antitrust analysis." (quoting Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 53 n.21)); Richard
A. Posner, The Rule of Reason and the Economic Approach: Reflections on the Sylvania Decision, 45
U. CHi. L. REv. 1, 13 (1977) ("One must not read a Supreme Court opinion like a bond
indenture, but it does appear that the Court is implying that antitrust prohibitions must
1999]
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have suggested that the Court meant this language to apply only to
the narrow question before it: whether exclusive territories should be
unlawful per se.29 According to these commentators, trader freedom
did notjustify per se treatment in light of the newly discovered benefits
of such agreements; still, they said, it should play a role in analyzing
these restraints under the Rule of Reason. s0
These contending positions reflected emerging disagreements
between two opposing schools of antitrust thought regarding the nor-
mative premises that should inform antitrust doctrine.31 The "Popu-
list" or "trader freedom" school embraces the traditional idea that an
important, perhaps central goal of antitrust doctrine is the enhance-
ment of trader freedom, even if such enhancement occasionally oc-
curs at the expense of consumers.32 The "consumer welfare" school,
on the other hand, holds that one should judge restraints solely ac-
cording to their effect on consumers.33 Although members of this
school disagree about how to define "consumer welfare," there is a
have an economic rationale and that the aesthetic delights of smallness .. .will not be
permitted to decide antitrust cases."). Similarly, without citing this dictum, Robert Bork
asserted that Sylvania implicitly rejected dealer freedom. See Robert H. Bork, Vertical Re-
straints: Schwinn Overruled, 1977 Sup. CT. REv. 171, 172 ("A great deal of doctrinal baggage
about the social purposes of these laws... was silently jettisoned.").
29 See, e.g., William B. Bohling, A Simplified Rule of Reason for Vertical Restraints.: Integrat-
ing Social Goals, Economic Analysis, and Sylvania, 64 IOwA L. REV. 461, 495-96 (1979) (argu-
ing that "the Court [did not] intimate that [trader freedom] should be kept from
consideration, or that economic efficiencies should become the sole determinant"); John
J. Flynn, The "Is" and "Ought" of Vertical Restraints After Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service
Corp., 71 CORNELL L. REv. 1095, 1101 (1986) ("Justice Powell's statement [in footnote 21
of Sylvania] hardly represents a resounding rejection of injecting social and economic val-
ues and broader economic goals into the interpretation of antitrust concepts. .. ").
30 See Bohling, supra note 29, at 497-503; Flynn, supra note 29, at 1101-02; see also
Eleanor M. Fox, The Modernization of Antitrust: A New Equilibrium, 66 CORNExLL L. REv. 1140,
1176-85 (1981) (accepting Sylvania but contending that trader freedom should still play a
role in vertical restraints doctrine).
31 See STEPHEN F. Ross, PRINCIPLES OF AsITRusT LAW 3-11 (1993) (comparing and
contrasting normative approaches of the "Chicago" and "Populist" schools); Jacobs, supra
note 1, at 226-40 (same).
32 See, e.g., John J. Flynn, Legal Reasoning Antitrust Policy and the Social "Science" of Eco-
nomics, 33 ANTITRUST BULL. 713, 719-20 (1988); Fox, supra note 30, at 1152-55; Robert
Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 1051, 1060-65 (1979) (arguing
that concerns regarding concentration of power motivated Congress when it amended § 7
of the Clayton Act); see also supra notes 7-13 and accompanying text (collecting sources
enunciating trader freedom approach).
33 See, e.g., 1 PHILLIP AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 100-13 (rev.
ed. 1997); ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTrrRusT PARADox 107-15 (1978); Frank H. Easter-
brook, Is There a Ratchet in Antitrust Law, 60 TEx. L. REv. 705, 715 (1982); Robert H.
Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpre-
tation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS LJ. 65 (1982).
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clear consensus that "trader freedom" should play no role in the de-
velopment of antitrust doctrine.3 4
In the two decades since Sylvania, the Court has avoided further
articulation of its normative vision for antitrust law and thus has re-
fused to explain whether trader freedom continues to be a worthy
consideration in the evolution of antitrust doctrine. To be sure, the
Court has de-emphasized trader freedom in several settings, often nar-
rowing the scope of decisions grounded upon this value.35 Unlike the
Sylvania Court, however, the Court has declined to explain its own
normative premises or to criticize those of its predecessors. Instead
the Court has rested its decisions upon advances in economic theory
that purportedly call its prior decisions into question.36
Although the Court has narrowed doctrines that were premised
on concern for trader freedom, it has refused to discard them alto-
gether.37 Tying law provides a ready example. Influenced by ad-
vances in economic thinking, the Court has made it more difficult for
plaintiffs to establish that a seller has "forced" a tie on a purchaser.
Specifically, the Court has required a plaintiff to prove that the seller
actually possesses market power before it can establish that forcing has
occurred.38 Still, the Court continues to adhere to the view that with-
out more, this forcing gives rise to per se liability, despite the general
34 Compare Lande, supra note 33 (equating consumer welfare with competitive pric-
ing), with BoRx, supra note 33, at 107-15 (defining "consumer welfare" as the aggregate
wealth of society).
35 See, e.g., Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209,
221-27 (1993) (narrowing the definition of "competitive injury" under the Robinson-Pat-
man Act); Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 726-31, 735-36 (1988)
(narrowing the definition of minimum rpm); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588-98 (1986) (heightening standards governing proof of predatory
pricing); Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S.
284, 296-98 (1985) (confiningperse rule against group boycotts to cases in which either (1)
the defendant possesses market power or (2) the boycott is not ancillary to an otherwise
legitimate joint venture).
36 See, e.g., Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 223-30 (relying upon revised thinking regarding
the feasibility of predation to narrow definition of "competitive injury" under Robinson-
Patman Act); Sharp, 485 U.S. at 725-28 (relying upon new understandings of the benefits of
vertical restraints to contract definition of minimum rpm); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 588-93
(relying upon literature concluding that predation is rare to heighten summaryjudgment
standards in cases alleging a predatory pricing conspiracy); see also William H. Page, Legal
Realism and the Shaping of Modern Antitrust 44 EMORY LJ. 1, 47-69 (1995) (arguing that the
Supreme Court has adjusted Warren-era doctrine in light of revised economic models).
37 See William H. Page, The Chicago School and the Evolution of Antitrust: Characterization,
Antitrust Injury, and Evidentiary Sufficiency, 75 VA. L. R-v. 1221, 1237-38, 1253-57 (1989)
(arguing that the Court has refused fully to embrace consumer welfare as the exclusive
goal of antitrust); Page, supra note 36, at 47-53.
38 SeeJefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 12-18 (1984); cf., e.g.,
United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 45 & n.4 (1962) (holding that, without more,
possession of a copyright confers "economic power" of the sort necessary to establish per se
liability). For a discussion of the evolution of the market power requirement in the tying
context, see Meese, supra note 9, at 18-21; Page, supra note 36, at 63-65.
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consensus that tying contracts are often innocuous or beneficial.3 9
While this position has led some scholars to criticize current doctrine
as incoherent, it flows naturally from a solicitude for the "freedom" of
traders and other purchasers. 40
Other examples illustrate the Court's reluctance to wholly discard
considerations of trader freedom. For instance, the Court has nar-
rowed the class of conduct deemed minimum rpm and has made it
more difficult for dealers alleging such conduct to survive summary
judgment.41 At the same time, however, the Court has retained the
per se rule against minimum rpm agreements, a position that many
attribute to a regard for trader freedom.42 Moreover, the Court has
continued to adhere to the per se rule against horizontal maximum
price fixing, even though such contracts can reduce consumer
prices.43 It is little wonder that long after Sylvania, lower courts and
39 See Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 12-15; cf Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical
Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 462-69 (1992) (reaffirming the per se rule); Jefferson Parish, 466
U.S. at 41-42 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (arguing that tying contracts should be lawful
absent proof of anticompetitive effect); BonR, supra note 33, at 372-81 (concluding that
tying contracts are rarely harmful).
40 See Thomas C. Arthur, Farewell to the Sea of Doubt: Jettisoning the Constitutional Sherman
Ac4 74 CAL. L. R~v. 263, 311 (1986) (referring to Jefferson Parish as "a Jekyll and Hyde"
opinion, in which "two... antitrust personalities struggle for dominance"); Diane Wood
Hutchinson, Antitrust 1984: Five Decisions in Search of a Theory, 1984 Sup. CT. Ray. 69, 134-35
(arguing that the majority opinion in Jefferson Parish was internally inconsistent and wanted
to "have things both ways").
41 See Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 726-31, 735-36 (1988);
Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 760-64 (1984); see also Barbara Ann
White, Black and White Thinking in the Gray Areas of Antitrust: The Dismantling of Vertical Re-
straints Regulation, 60 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1, passim (1991) (reviewing the Court's recent
vertical restraints jurisprudence and arguing that it has created a regime of per se legality
with respect to certain vertical price restraints).
42 See Sharp, 485 U.S. at 735-36; Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 761 n.7 (refusing to reconsider
per se rule against minimum rpm, ostensibly because the lower courts had not addressed
the question); Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 51 n.18 (1977)
(stating that its holding did not undermine the per se rule against minimum rpm); see also
id. at 67 (White, J., concurring in judgment) (arguing that the ban on minimum rpm rests
upon concern for the freedom of traders); Khan v. State Oil Co., 93 F.3d 1358, 1364 (7th
Cir. 1996) (Posner, C.J.) (opining that the Court's continuing hostility toward minimum
rpm must rest upon something other than a concern for consumer welfare); Flynn, supra
note 29, at 1144 ("[Resale price maintenance] impairs a central goal of antitrust policy-
the independence of traders to set their own price .... ."); Fox, supra note 30, at 1184
("The per se rule against vertical price-fixing reflects the value that sellers of goods should
have the freedom to charge the price they see fit .. ").
43 See Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 354 (1982); Peter M.
Gerhart, The Supreme Court and Antitrust Analysis: The (Near) Triumph of The Chicago Schoo;
1982 Sup. CT. REv. 319, 344-48 (contending that the Maricopa County decision rests upon a
rejection of consumer welfare as the sole normative value in antitrust); Louis Kaplow, Anti-
trust, Law &Economics, and the Courts, L v & CorEmp. PROBS., Autumn 1987, at 181, 205
(same).
[Vol. 84:763
INCO-ERENTCE 1N ANTITRUST DOCTR[NE
scholars disagree in their assessment of the Court's attitude toward
trader freedom.44
In Khan, the Court had a unique opportunity to clarify the role, if
any, that trader freedom should play in antitrust policy. The Khan
Court reconsidered its holding in Albrecht, which had declared maxi-
mum rpm-a practice that reduces consumer prices-unlawful per se.
Because the Albrecht Court explicitly rested its decision upon solici-
tude for trader freedom, economic theory alone, it seemed, could not
justify repudiating the decision, even if the theory demonstrated that
Albrecht's rule harmed consumers. Rejection of Albrecht seemingly
would require an explicit renunciation of "trader freedom," while ad-
herence would require its reaffirmation.
As many had hoped,45 the Court overruled Albrecht in Khan.46 It
did so, however, without indicating whether trader freedom does and
should continue to play a role in antitrust law. Instead, without ques-
tioning Albrecht's commitment to this value, the Court claimed that
advances in economic theory required it to overturn Albrecht.47 As
shown below, however, the Court's reasoning proved unconvincing,
leading one to suspect that Kan involved more than simply the minis-
terial application of economic theory and to wonder just what role
trader freedom will play in future decisions.
II
ECONOMIC THEORY AND TRADER FREEDOM: A
RociKy RELATIONSHIP
A. Economic Theory as Figleaf: Price Theory and Albrech's
Protection of Traders
On its face, Albrecht presented an almost paradigmatic conflict be-
tween trader freedom and consumers. The facts were straightfor-
44 Compare Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz, 807 F.2d 520, 566-70 (7th Cir. 1986) (Easter-
brook, J., concurring and dissenting) (arguing that Supreme Court precedent reflects sin-
gular concern for consumer welfare), and Ross, supra note 31, at 3 ("The now ascendant
view is that antitrust laws should promote allocative efficiency."), with Rothery Storage v.
Atlas Van Lines, 792 F.2d 210, 231-32 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Wald, J., concurring) (arguing that
precedent reflects concern for noneconomic values), HovENKAMp, supra note 9, § 2.2e, at
69 (arguing that current law does not uniformly reflect concern for economic efficiency),
and Page, supra note 36, at 47-69 (same).
45 See, e.g., Roger D. Blair & Gordon L. Lang, Albrecht After ARCO: Maximum Resale
Price Fixing Moves Toward the Rule of Reason, 44 VANID. L. Rxv. 1007, 1032 (1991); see also
Khan, 93 F.3d at 1363 (Posner, CJ.) ("Albrecht was unsound when decided, and is inconsis-
tent with later decisions by the Supreme Court. It should be overruled. Someday, we ex-
pect, it will be.").
46 See Khan, 118 S. Ct. at 284-85.
47 See id. at 283 ("After reconsidering Albrecht's rationale ... we conclude that there is
insufficient economic justification for per se invalidation of vertical maximum price
fixing.").
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ward. 48 The Herald Company published a morning paper in St.
Louis, the Globe-Democrat. Herald appointed Albrecht as a Globe dis-
tributor, subject to Herald's written policy setting a ceiling on resale
prices.49 Albrecht, however, insisted on charging a price higher than
that which Herald had set and had advertised to the public. Herald
engaged in self-help, delivering papers to Albrecht's customers at the
advertised prices. Albrecht then relented, lowering his prices before
eventually selling the route to another entrepreneur.
The Court found that Herald's maintenance of maximum resale
prices was a per se violation of the Sherman Act.50 To the casual
reader, the Court's decision may have appeared to rest upon concern
for consumers and efficiency, as the Court offered three ways in which
maximum rpm agreements could have negative economic conse-
quences. Such agreements, the Court said, could set prices so low as
to prevent small dealers from providing essential services to consum-
ers.51 Moreover, by setting prices below the costs that some dealers
faced, maximum rpm agreements could "channel distribution
through a few large or specifically advantaged dealers. '52 Finally, the
Court suggested that a purportedly maximum resale price in fact
tends to become a minimum.53
The Court's eagerness to ascribe deleterious consequences to
such agreements flowed naturally from the state of economic science
at the time. Price theory, the then-dominant economic paradigm,
treated the boundaries of the firm as a given, determined by technol-
ogy.54 The only transactions contemplated by this paradigm involved
the sale of an item from one firm to another with no accompanying
contractual restrictions.55 Moreover, this paradigm recognized only
those efficiencies that could be achieved within a firm, such as econo-
mies of scale or superior management.56 The price-theory paradigm
48 Unless otherwise noted, the facts are taken from the Supreme Court's opinion. See
Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 144, 147-49 (1968).
49 See Albrecht v. Herald Co., 367 F.2d 517, 519 (8th Cir. 1966).
50 See Albrecht, 390 U.S. at 152-53.
51 See i&
52 Id. at 153.
53 See id&
54 See R.H. COASE, Industrial Organization: A Proposal for Research, in THE FIRM, THE MAR-
=ET, AND ThE LAW 57, 60-67 (1988); OLWER E. WILUIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INsrrruTIONS OF
CAPITALISM 7 (1985); George J. Stigler, The Division of Labor Is Limited by the Extent of the
Market, 59J. POL. ECON. 185, 185 (1951) (stating that economists "have generally treated as
a (technological?) datum the problem of what the firm does-what governs its range of
activities or functions").
55 See Richard N. Langlois, Contract, Competition and Efficiency, 55 BRooxuLN L. REv.
831, 835 (1989).
56 See Oliver E. Williamson, Delimiting Antitrust, 76 GEo. LJ. 271, 272 (1987). For ex-
amples of this outlook, see DONALD DEWEY, MONOPOLY IN ECONOMICs AND LAW 201-02
(1959); Friedrich Kessler & Richard H. Stern, Competition, Contract, and Vertical Integration,
69 YALE LJ. 1, 2-3 (1959).
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gave rise, in turn, to the "inhospitality tradition" of antitrust.57 Within
this milieu, it was difficult to characterize maximum rpm agreements
as reflecting any cooperative effort between manufacturer and dealer
to improve customer service. Instead, scholars characterized vertical
restraints, and other nonstandard contracts that influenced dealers'
decisions after passage of tifle, as unnatural, "coercive" efforts to ex-
tend the "power" of a manufacturer beyond its normal boundaries to
the detriment of dealers and consumers.5 8 The Albrecht Court's asser-
tion that, for instance, manufacturers might employ maximum rpm to
drive prices below dealer costs-even if this strategy harmed consum-
ers-fits comfortably within this tradition.
Even on its own terms, however, the Albrecht Court's analysis of
the economic consequences of maximum rpm did not warrant per se
treatment. To begin with, the fear that maximum rpm would channel
distribution through larger, more efficient dealers did not derive from
regard for consumer welfare, but instead a desire to protect smaller,
less efficient producers. Moreover, even if the Court's concerns could
be deemed "economic," they still did not justify per se treatment of
maximum rpm agreements. Previously, the Court had reserved such
treatment for only those agreements that, by their nature, had a "per-
nicious effect on competition." 59 The Albrecht Court, however, did not
assert that maximum rpm "always" or "almost always" had the "perni-
cious" economic effects it identified.60 Instead, the Court simply
57 See Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust 63 TEx. L. Rm. 1, 4-7 (1984)
(describing the inhospitality tradition); Williamson, supra note 56, at 272-73 & n.6. The
phrase "inhospitality tradition" apparently was coined by Professor Donald Turner, who
said: "I approach territorial and customer restrictions not hospitably in the common law
tradition, but inhospitably in the tradition of antitrust law." Donald F. Turner, Some Reflec-
tions on Antitrus=4 1966 N.Y. ST. B.A. AIrTRusT L. SYmP. 1, 1-2.
58 See WLLIAMSON, supra note 54, at 371 ("[S)ince there is nothing to be gained by
introducing nonstandard terms into market-mediated exchange, the use of contract re-
straints was presumed to have anticompetitive purpose and affect [sic]."); Alan J. Meese,
Price Theory and Vertical Restraints: A Misunderstood Relation, 45 UCLA L. REv. 143, 176-83
(1997); Rudolph J. Peritz, A Genealogy of Vertical Restraints Doctrine, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 511,
538-41 (1989) (concluding that Albrecht was based upon a desire to "redistribute bargaining
power between large producers and small distributors"). The remarks of one commenta-
tor, who approved of Albrecht, capture nicely the attitude of the time. SeeJerrold G. Van
Cise, Franchising-From Power to Partnership, 15 ANITRUST BuLL. 443, 443 (1970) (analogiz-
ing a franchisor to a "medieval feudal lord holding the power of economic life and death
over enfranchised serfs"). Some commentators continue to characterize vertical restraints
in this manner. See, e.g.,JohnJ. Flynn &James F. Ponsoldt, Legal Reasoning and the Jurispru-
dence of Vertical Restraints: The Limitations of Neoclassical Economic Analysis in the Resolution of
Antitrust Disputes, 62 N.Y.U. L. Ry. 1125, 1149 & n.91 (1987) (arguing that the agreement
in Albrecht resulted from unequal bargaining power).
59 Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
60 Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1979) (hold-
ing that the per se rule should be applied only to a practice that "facially appears to be one
that would always or almost always tend to restrict competition and decrease output" (cit-
ing Northern Pacific 356 U.S. at 4)).
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stated that each of these effects "may" occur.61 However, it did invoke
one effect that these agreements always had: a limitation on the "free-
dom" of dealers to price as they saw fit.62 Indeed, as a logical matter,
the absence of any assertion that maximum rpm "certainly" or even
"probably" produced negative economic effects indicates that this lim-
itation on trader freedom-not any purported anticompetitive ef-
fects-led the Albrecht Court to declare these restraints unlawful. 63 In
fact, in his concurrence in Sylvania, Justice White, the author of Al-
brecht, admitted as much, citing Albrecht as one of several decisions pre-
mised upon "concern for the freedom of the businessman to dispose
of his own goods as he sees fit."64 By invoking the specter of more
concrete anticompetitive consequences, the Albrecht Court managed
to mask any appearance that it was protecting dealers at the expense
of consumers. Economic theory, such as it was, served as a convenient
fig leaf, donned by a Court unwilling to admit it was giving "trader
freedom" dispositive effect. 65
61 Albrecht 390 U.S. at 152-53.
62 "[A]greements to fix maximum prices 'no less than those to fix minimum prices,
cripple the freedom of traders and thereby restrain their ability to sell in accordance with
their ownjudgment.'" Id. at 152 (quoting Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons,
Inc., 340 U.S. 211, 213 (1951)).
63 One leading commentator reached this conclusion at the time. See Milton Han-
dler, Through the Antitrust Looking Glass-Tweno-First Annual Antitrust Review, 57 CAL. L.
RF.v. 182, 194 (1969) (arguing that "the test of legality [in Albrecht] is not so much whether
there was technically an unreasonable restraint of trade as whether the complainant, by
entering into a contract .... has surrendered his economic freedom"); see also Kauper,
supra note 16, at 334 (arguing that 1960s vertical restraints doctrine had "become the vehi-
cle for redressing the imbalance of bargaining power which threatens the exercise of [a
dealer's] independent judgment").
64 Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 67 (1977) (White, J., con-
curring in the judgment).
65 See generally Kauper, supra note 16, at 330-31 (questioning, among other things,
"whether the Court has simply used economic doctrine to support decisions arrived at
upon other grounds"). On this score, there is a constructive comparison between Albrecht
and United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966). Writing for the majority in Von's
Grocery, Justice Black was content to declare the merger in question unlawful because it was
part of a trend toward concentration that threatened to eliminate the role of "'small deal-
ers and worthy men'" in the Los Angeles grocery market. Id at 274-78 (quoting United
States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 323 (1897)). Justice White, who would
author Albrecht two years later, concurred, attempting to explain that the merger in ques-
tion would, in fact, lead to oligopolistic interdependence and higher prices. See id. at 280-
81 (White, J., concurring). By assigning the Albrecht opinion to Justice White, then, the
Chief Justice assured the Court of two opinions for the price of one: Justice Black's con-
cern for trader freedom and Justice White's "fig leaf" economics. See generally Rowe, supra
note 16, at 1524-25 (showing that, in the 1960s, the Court "fused Populist ideals with oli-
gopoly learning into strict anti-merger norms").
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B. The Collapse of Price Theory: Albrecht Meets the New
Institutional Economics
Albrecht rested upon a normative vision that is willing to elevate
the welfare of traders over that of consumers; otherwise the Court
would have had difficulty sustaining the decision. In reconsidering
Albrecht, the Khan Court could have affirmed the dictum in Sylvania
that trader freedom should play no role in antitrust doctrine. 66 Thus,
the Court could have disposed of Albrecht and definitively asserted its
position on the role of trader freedom in antitrust law.
The Court chose another course, however, attempting to repudi-
ate Albrecht without questioning its normative vision at all. Just as the
Albrecht Court had purported to rely upon economic theory in justify-
ing its decision to declare maximum rpm unlawful per se, the Khan
Court invoked economics to rebut it. In so doing, the Court cited a
large body of scholarship maintaining that maximum rpm likely
benefitted consumers. 67 Much of this work reflected a reversal of the
inhospitality tradition, a reversal that resulted from the new institu-
tional economics ("NIE")-the self-described antithesis to the price
theoretic models that tacitly had informed the Court in Albrecht.68
Unlike price theory and the inhospitality tradition that it bred,
which assumed that nonstandard contracts were coercive and monop-
olistic, the NIE established a presumption that such restraints were
designed to attenuate the costs that might accompany a manufac-
turer's decision to rely upon a network of dealers to distribute its
goods. 69 One such cost is the possibility that dealers will charge exor-
bitant prices, perhaps higher than those the manufacturer has adver-
tised. This price gouging, of course, can dilute the manufacturer's
goodwill, as well as that of its other dealers, thereby reducing the over-
all demand for the product involved.70 By adopting a maximum price
limitation a manufacturer can prevent this behavior and protect itself,
66 See Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 53 n.21.
67 For instance, the Court relied very heavily upon (then) Professor Easterbrook's
article, Maximum Price Fixing, supra note 28. See Khan, 118 S. Ct. at 281-83 (citing this
article four times). Like much of Judge Easterbrook's work, this article abandoned the
"inhospitality tradition" in favor of the benevolent attitude of the NIE. See, e.g., Easter-
brook, supra note 57, at 4-7 (condemning the inhospitality tradition); Frank H. Easter-
brook, Vertical Arrangements and the Rule of Reason, 53 A'rrrrusT L.J. 135, 150 (1984)
(applying NIE approach to vertical restraints).
68 See WILLJAMSoN, supra note 54, at 1-2, 12-18; Meese, supra note 58, at 166-68
(describing rivalry between the NIE and price theory); see also supra notes 54-58 and accom-
panying text (describing how Albrecht reflected price-theoretic economics).
69 See WIuAMSON, supra note 54, at 28 (characterizing the NIE as "maintain[ing] the
rebuttable presumption that nonstandard forms of contracting have efficiency purposes").
70 SeeJack Walters & Sons Corp. v. Morton Bldg., Inc., 737 F.2d 698, 706 (7th Cir.
1984); Brief Amicus Curiae of the National Beer Wholesalers Association, Inc. in Support of
Petitioners at 7-8, Khan (No. 96-871) [hereinafter National Beer Brief in Support of Peti-
tioners]; Easterbrook, supra note 28, at 892-95; Meese, supra note 58, at 165-66, 188.
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as well as those dealers who refrain from opportunistic gouging.71 Al-
brecht, of course, involved just such an arrangement.
By positing such benevolent explanations for maximum rpm, the
NIE rebuts Albrecht's presumption that nonstandard contracts are co-
ercive or unnatural. Rather, it suggests that such arrangements may
be part of a cooperative effort to serve consumers. 72 The Khan Court
did not, by any means, articulate fully a new institutional framework
for analyzing these agreements. Indeed, some scholars on whom the
Court relied offered critiques of Albrecht internal to price theory.73
Still, following in the spirit of Sylvania,74 the Khan Court's critique of
Albrecht's economic analysis reflected a reversal of the inhospitable at-
titude toward nonstandard agreements. For instance, the Court sug-
gested that manufacturers would not deliberately set prices so low as
to prevent dealers from offering essential services. 75 Also, the Court
asserted that manufacturers have little incentive to exclude potential
dealers from the market by attempting to channel distribution
through only a few advantaged firms. 76 Finally, the Justices opined
that an arrangement that set prices so low as to disfavor inefficient
dealers would not "necessarily" harm consumers.77 In short, the Khan
Court concluded that "the potential injuries cited in Albrecht [were]
less serious than the Court imagined."78
Though basically correct, the Khan Court's exegesis was insuffi-
cient to repudiate Albrecht. Even on its face, Albrecht did not rest solely
upon maximum rpm's (purported) economic consequences. In fact,
Khan and his supporters did not rely solely upon the negative eco-
nomic consequences identified in Albrecht, but instead invoked the dis-
cretion of dealers to price according to their own bestjudgment.79 As
71 See Jack Walters & Sons, 737 F.2d at 706; Easterbrook, supra note 28, at 893-95;
Meese, supra note 58, at 165-66.
72 See Meese, supra note 58, at 188-89.
73 See, e.g., Blair & Lang, supra note 45, at 1011-17 (arguing that manufacturers with
market power can use maximum rpm to prevent dealers from adding to the monopoly
markup already imposed by the manufacturer), cited with approval in Khan, 118 S. Ct. at
282-83.
74 See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49-59 (1977) (relying
upon revised economic learning regarding vertical restraints to overrule United States v.
Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967)); WIL..iASON, supra note 54, at 371-72 (attrib-
uting Sylvania's reversal of Schwinn to a rejection of the price-theoretic paradigm and ac-
companying inhospitality tradition).
75 See Khan, 118 S. Ct. at 282-83.
76 See id. at 283.
77 I
78 .
79 See Brief for Respondents at 3-9, Khan (No. 96-871); Joint Amicus Curiae Brief in
Support of Respondent of National Coalition of Petroleum Retailers and Auto Service
Dealers of America Automotive Trades Organization of California at 16-18, Khan (No. 96-
871) [hereinafter Petroleum Retailers and Auto Service Dealers Brief in Support of Re-
spondent]; Brief of Amici Curiae Minnesota Service Station and Convenience Store Associ-
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it had done in Sylvania, however, the Court refused to give dispositive
weight to trader freedom. But unlike the Sylvania, Court, which had
offered a normative vision different from Albrecht's, the Khan Court
turned again to economics. The Court declared that Albrecht's claim
that maximum rpm limited the freedom of traders, like its other asser-
tions, was merely "theoretical."80 As a matter of fact, the Khan Court
said, the Albrecht rule actually conflicted with trader freedom in some
instances. Echoing the contentions of several scholars, the Court
claimed that the per se ban on maximum rpm had impelled some firms
to integrate forward into distribution, thus eliminating the very in-
dependent businesses that Albrecht tried to protect.8 ' Accordingly,
maximum rpm did not "always" or "almost always" infringe on trader
freedom; rather, in some cases it actually enhanced it by averting the
forward integration that would follow a ban on the practice.
According to Khan, Albrecht's error lay not in its normative ac-
count of the effects that matter for antitrust purposes, but instead in
its descriptive account of the effects that maximum rpm produces.
Any disagreement between the two decisions, it seems, is purely tech-
nical. Indeed, in justifying its decision to overrule Albrecht despite the
force of stare decisis, the Court declared that "the theoretical under-
pinnings of [Albrecht] are called into serious question."82 The repudi-
ation of Albrecht, the Khan Court wanted us to believe, was mandated
by a change in scientific understandings that require a different appli-
cation of Albrecht's unchanged principles.8 3 This development ap-
peared to be entirely external to the Court or its normative premises,
occurring instead within the autonomous discipline of economics.8 4
ation at 3, 11-12, Khan (No. 96-871) [hereinafter Minnesota Service Station et al. Brief in
Support of Respondent].
80 Khan, 118 S. Ct. at 282.
81 See id. ("'[T]he ban on maximum resale price limitations declared in Albrecht in the
name of 'dealer freedom' has actually prompted many suppliers to integrate forward into
distribution, thus eliminating the very independent trader for whom Albrecht professed so-
licitude.'" (quoting 7 [sic] PHILUIp E. AREEDA, ANTiTRusr LAW 1635, at 395 (1989)); see
also Ross, supra note 31, at 254 (noting that "[a] s a result of Albrech virtually every newspa-
per in the country has begun to use agents or employees rather than independent entities
to distribute its issues"); Roger D. Blair & James M. Fesmire, Maximum Price Fixing and the
Goals of Antitrus 37 SYRAcusE L. Rnv. 43, 59-67, 72-73 (1986) (arguing that firms prohib-
ited from imposing maximum rpm will consider forward integration as an alternative).
82 Khan, 118 S. Ct. at 284; see also id. at 285 (arguing that the Court could appropri-
ately overrule Albrecht even though it should "not 'lightly assume that the economic reali-
ties underlying earlier decisions have changed, or that earlier judicial perceptions of those
realities were in error'" (quoting Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717,
732 (1988))).
83 See Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REv. 1165, 1247-1250 (1993)
(describing such an interpretive approach in the antitrust context).
84 I do not mean to argue that this change in economic theory was in fact unrelated
to the Court or antitrust doctrine, only that it appeared exogenous. After all, many advances
in theory seem to have occurred in at least partial response to decisions protecting the
freedom of traders. See, e.g., Oliver E. Williamson, Assessing Vertical Market Restrictions: Anti-
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In discarding Albrecht, then, the Court joined those scholars-particu-
larly members of the consumer welfare school-who have asserted
that revised understandings of economic theory ipso facto require re-
pudiation of the antitrust jurisprudence associated with the trader
freedom era.85
The Khan Court purportedly based its decision on positive eco-
nomics. As a result, it neither criticized Albrecht's normative vision nor
affirmed the contrary vision as expressed in Sylvania's dictum. Khan's
failure to affirm Sylvania's dictum may have been an oversight and
thus not reflective of any conscious decision to avoid speaking in a
normative voice. This explanation seems unlikely, however, for the
material before the Court quite squarely presented it with the choice
between competing normative visions. For instance, the brief of the
United States, upon which the Court relied, quoted Sylvania's dictum
arguing explicitly that trader freedom should play no role in the de-
velopment of antitrust doctrine.8 6 A second brief, supporting contin-
ued adherence to Albrechts per se rule, urged the Court to resist the
"myth" that Sylvania had abandoned trader freedom.8 7 Other briefs
reiterated the contention of the United States and maintained that
Sylvania had repudiated Albrech's solicitude for trader freedom.88 Fi-
nally, a law review article on which the Court relied quoted Sylvania's
dictum and claimed that the decision signalled the Court's repudia-
trust Ramifications of the Transaction Cost Approach, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 953 (1979) (employing
Schwinn as an instance in which the Court misunderstood the economics of vertical rela-
tionships and advocating departure from the inhospitality tradition).
85 See Bork, supra note 28, at 186-92; Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust
Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. Ry. 925, 925-33 (1979); cf Frank H. Easterbrook, AllocatingAntitrust
Decisionmaking Tasks, 76 GEo. LJ. 305, 308-09 (1987) ("The empirical foundation on which
much antitrust policy was built has been washed away.").
86 See Brief for the United States and the Federal Trade Commission as Amici Curiae
Supporting Reversal at 22-23, Khan (No. 96-871) [hereinafter United States Brief Support-
ing Reversal]; see also Khan, 118 S. Ct. at 283 (asserting that "amid curiae have [not] called
our attention to any cases in which enforcement efforts have been directed solely against
the conduct encompassed by Albrecht's per se rule"); United States Brief Supporting Rever-
sal, supra, at 24-25 (asserting that the government has not pursued a case of maximum rpm
after Albrecht).
87 See Petroleum Retailers and Auto Service Dealers Brief in Support of Respondent,
supra note 79, at 17-18 (arguing that Sylvania's footnote 21 did not "put[ ] to bed any
antitrust concern over the right and ability of small businesses to compete"); see also Minne-
sota Service Station et al. Brief in Support of Respondent, supra note 79, at 12 n.13 (argu-
ing that footnote 21 did not reject trader freedom as a relevant consideration when price
restraints are concerned).
88 See, e.g., National Beer Brief in Support of Petitioners, supra note 70, at 3 ("The per
se rule set forth in Albrecht ... is plainly inconsistent with the 'consumer welfare' and
'competition based on efficiency' premises of modern antitrust law. .. ."); Brief of the
American Petroleum Institute as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 10, 16-17, Khan
(No. 96-871) (arguing that Sylvania "decisively rejected" any role for trader freedom).
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tion of trader freedom as a goal accorded weight under the antitrust
laws.89
C. A Poor Translation: Khan's Implicit Rejection of Trader
Freedom
The practice of adjusting antitrust doctrine to reflect advances in
economic theory has a solid pedigree, including antecedents predat-
ing the Sherman Act itself.90 This approach, which some commenta-
tors refer to as "translation," ensures that the law continues to
promote the values Congress meant to implement as the world or our
understanding of it changes. 91 On the surface, Khan's treatment of
Albrecht seems to fall squarely within this tradition. Closer analysis,
however, demonstrates that Khan's purely descriptive critique of Al-
brecht ultimately comes up short; economic theory simply cannot do all
of the work the Court assigned to it.
Albrecht did not really depend upon any assertion that the inci-
dence of negative economic consequences of maximum rpm are "seri-
ous" or even, for that matter, "likely." To the contrary, the Court
simply asserted that such consequences "may" occur.92 Convincing as
it was, Khan's demonstration that these consequences are not likely
does not undermine Albrecht, at least not when taken on its own terms.
Similarly, Khan's assertion that maximum rpm agreements that
drive inefficient dealers out of business would not "necessarily" harm
consumers may be entirely correct as a matter of economic theory.
Yet it simply begs the question: whether harm to consumers or the
welfare of dealers is the appropriate concern for antitrust purposes.
For the Albrecht Court, trader freedom trumped the welfare of con-
sumers, and the Court plainly favored inefficient dealers harmed by
89 See Easterbrook, supra note 28, at 888 ("The Supreme Court has overruled Schwinn
and explicitly rejected any analysis that makes antitrust cases turn on the 'autonomy of
independent businessmen.' Arguments about the effect of a practice on quantity and
price, not arguments about freedom and autonomy, control antitrust analysis." (quoting
Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 53 n.21 (1977))). The Khan Court
approvingly cited pages 887-890 of this article. See Khan, 118 S. Ct. at 281 (footnote
omitted).
90 See Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 731-34 (1988); Sylva-
nia, 433 U.S. at 47-59; Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 360-61
(1933); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 56-60 (1911); Gibbs v. Consolidated
Gas Co., 130 U.S. 396, 409 (1889); Diamond Match Co. v. Roeber, 13 N.E. 419, 421-22
(N.Y. 1887); Kellogg v. Larkin, 3 Pin. 123, 139-141 (Wis. 1851); see also HovENKtup, supra
note 9, § 2.2a, at 59-61 (tracing influence of changes in economic theory on antitrust
doctrine).
91 See Robert H. Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act 9 J.L. & EcoN.
7, 48 (1966) (arguing that Congress intended the courts to adjust antitrust doctrine in
response to changes in economic theory); Lessig, supra note 83, at 1247-50 (applying the-
ory of interpretive translation in the antitrust context).
92 Albrecht 390 U.S. at 152-53.
1999]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
maximum rpm over the consumers who enjoyed its benefits. Khan's
contrary determination, that inefficient dealers deserve no protection,
rests upon an unexpressed normative choice and not any advances in
economic theory.
But what of the Court's assertion that Albrecht led to forward inte-
gration to the detriment of dealers? Certainly this argument did not
depend upon a rejection of Albrecht's normative vision, or did it? The
empirical basis for the Court's finding is at best inadequate. Vertical
integration may have costs of its own, costs that may prevent the adop-
tion of such a strategy.93 Khan, after all, had received his dealership
well after Albrecht, which therefore did not interfere with his free-
dom.94 In support of its assertion that Albrecht impelled significant
forward integration, the Court cited but one scholar, who in turn pro-
vided only one example in which such integration had occurred: the
newspaper industry.9 5 Thus, the Court's hypothesis about the effects
of Albrecht upon "dealer freedom" is sheer guesswork, with no stronger
basis in empirical fact than, for instance, Albrechts own assertion that
maximum rpm would prevent dealers from providing essential serv-
ices. 96 One suspects that like the Albrecht Court's "concern" for the
negative effects of maximum rpm, Khan's concern for forward integra-
tion is a convenient pretext designed to support a predetermined de-
cision to disregard trader freedom.97
93 See Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A
Theoy of Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J. POL. ECON. 691, 716 (1986) ("[Complete]
integration shifts the incentives for opportunistic and distortionary behavior, but it does
not remove these incentives.").
94 In fact, there is evidence that dealer-run gasoline stations generally face lower costs
than those owned by manufacturers. SeeS. REP. No. 102-450, at 6 (1992) (concluding that
independent gasoline stations face lower costs than company-owned outlets).
95 See Khan, 118 S. Ct. at 282 (quoting 7 [sic) AREEDA, supra note 81, 1635, at 395);
id. (citing PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAw 729.7, at 599-614
(1996 Supp.)).
96 I do not mean to suggest that it would be impossible to build an empirical case in
support of the Court's assumption. After all, the burden of creating such a case would be
far lighter than the burden of establishing per se illegality. To invoke per se treatment, the
Court must conclude that a practice "always" or "almost always" has a prohibited effect. See
FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411,432-34 (1990). Thus, proof that a
practice does not engender a "prohibited effect" in a significant proportion of cases would
be sufficient to defeat application of the per se rule. The Khan Court, however, did not
define "significant"; nor did it point to any such proof. Thus, even if such evidence should
come to light, one cannot conclude that the Court based its decision on any bona fide
concern for "trader freedom."
97 Ironically, there is one sense in which advances in economic theory do suggest that
maximum rpm enhances dealer freedom. To the extent that a manufacturer demands
maximum rpm agreements to protect its distribution system-including dealers-from op-
portunistic price gouging, such agreements are best characterized as voluntary integration
that, like many contracts, enhance the freedom of dealers. See Meese, supra note 58, at 188-
89. The Khan Court, however, did not recognize this implication of the NIE.
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Finally, the (purported) fact that a per se rule against maximum
rpm has produced some forward integration does not, by itself, under-
mine Albrecht, absent rejection of its normative vision. The feasibility
of vertical integration is a function of antitrust doctrine, which con-
demns certain forms of forward integration as monopolistic. 9 8 In-
deed, in expressing concern over Albrecht-induced forward
integration, the Court relied on a scholar who cited only instances in
which such integration induced newspaper carriers to bring monopo-
lization suits.99
Whether the Court would deem monopolistic the sort of forward
integration that Albrecht envisioned depends, in part, upon the scope
of the relevant market.10 0 Most manufacturers will not have monopo-
lies and thus would be able to integrate forward with impunity. Enter
the Court's fairly recent decision in Eastman Kodak, Co. v. Image Techni-
cal Services, Inc.'01 In Kodak, a decision that some traced to concern
for small businesses, the Court held that the presence of sunk invest-
ments and information costs could create a market-there a market
for Kodak spare parts sold to uninformed purchasers-for antitrust
purposes.10 2 Like the customers in Kodak, dealers also incur sunk
costs and may not be fully informed of the possibility that their suppli-
ers will act opportunistically. 10 3 Thus, it is conceptually possible to
define the dealership opportunity itself as a relevant market over
which the manufacturer maintains a monopoly.10 4 This similarity be-
98 See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359, 368-69, 375
(1927).
99 See 8 AREEDA, supra note 81, 1635, at 395; 3 PmLLiP E. AREEDA & HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, ANrrRusT LAW 729 (rev. ed. 1996). Similarly, in claiming that Albrecht had
led to forward integration, the United States could cite only cases in which such integra-
tion had spawned lengthy antitrust litigation. See United States Brief Supporting Reversal,
supra note 86, at 23 n.10 (citing Northwest Publications, Inc. v. Crumb, 752 F.2d 473, 475
(9th Cir. 1985); Paschall v. Kansas City Star Co., 727 F.2d 692, 695 (8th Cir. 1984) (en
banc)).
10o See Belfiore v. New York Times Co., 826 F.2d 177, 180-81 (2d Cir. 1987) (finding
forward integration by the New York Times Company lawful because, inter alia, it faced
competition from other papers).
101 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
102 See id. at 462-63, 477-79; see also Eleanor M. Fox, Eastman Kodak Company v. Image
Technical Services, Inc.-Information Failure as Soul or Hook7, 62 ANTrrrusT LJ. 759, 766
(1994) (arguing that Kodak rested upon a desire to protect opportunities for independent
providers of repair and maintenance services for Kodak copiers).
103 See George A. Hay, Is the Glass Half-Empty or Half-Full?: Reflections on the Kodak Case,
62 ANTrrRUsT L.J. 177, 185-88 (1993) (describing possible extensions of Kodak to the
franchise context); see also Fox, supra note 102, at 766 (contending that, if Kodak were
taken to its logical conclusion, "[f]loodgates would open for franchisees to sue
franchisors").
104 See Warren S. Grimes, When Do Franchisors Have Market Power? Antitrust Remedies for
Franchisor Opportunism, 65 ANrrRUST LJ. 105, 136-41 (1996); Hay, supra note 103, at 185-
86. Courts have yet to reach a consensus on whether a dealership opportunity can be a
relevant market. Compare Queen City Pizza, Inc. v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 124 F.3d 430, 438-
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tween dealers and the Kodak consumers bolsters the argument that
"unfair" conduct, such as forward integration by manufacturers, is an
abuse of monopoly power.' 0 5
In Khan, the Court was not in a position to address Kodak's rele-
vance in the dealership context. Thus, it is difficult to infer from the
Court's indifference toward forward integration a conclusion that
manufacturers generally will lack monopoly power. After all, the only
examples of such integration, of which the Court was made aware,
involved firms that courts had deemed monopolists before the Kodak
decision. 106
Forward integration by a monopolist is lawful only if a legitimate
justification supports it.'0 7 Yet this simply begs the question as to what
is "legitimate." Is it legitimate for a manufacturer to integrate because
its costs of distribution, and thus prices, are lower than those of its
dealers? Or would this integration constitute predatory conduct, sub-
jecting the manufacturer to treble damages?108 The answer depends
upon whether the Court construes the Sherman Act to ensure the sur-
vival of small dealers against the onslaught of more efficient manufac-
turers-a question the Court has not addressed explicitly. 0 9
41 (3d Cir. 1997) (rejecting claim that franchise opportunity constituted relevant market
because obligations creating relationship were contractual in nature), with Collins v. Inter-
national Dairy Queen, Inc., 939 F. Supp. 875, 877-80 (M.D. Ga. 1996) (relying on Kodak for
proposition that franchisor possessed "monopoly" over franchise opportunity). For a pow-
erful argument that the sort of market imperfections identified in Kodak should not give
rise to market power, see Thomas C. Arthur, The Costly Quest for Perfect Competition: Kodak
and Nonstructural Market Power, 69 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1 (1994).
105 See Photovest Corp. v. Fotomat Corp., 606 F.2d 704, 714-21 (7th Cir. 1979); Grimes,
supra note 104, at 136-41.
106 See United States Brief Supporting Reversal, supra note 86, at 23 n.10 (citing Pas-
chall v. Kansas City Star Co., 727 F.2d 692, 696 (8th Cir. 1984) (en banc), a case decided
prior to Kodak as support for the claim that Albrecht led to forward integration).
107 See Kodak, 504 U.S. at 483-86; Aspen Skiing Corp. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp.,
472 U.S. 585, 608-11 (1985); Grimes, supra note 104, at 141.
108 Cf Paschall 727 F.2d at 695 (rejecting the panel's conclusion that the newspaper's
forward integration was monopolistic because the integration allowed the firm to "set an
area-wide uniform price for its newspapers and provide readers with better, more respon-
sive service").
109 See Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 116 n.11 (1986) (reserving
the question whether efficiency driven, above-cost pricing that drives a firm out of business
can produce "antitrust injury" in light of social and political values). To be sure, in Atlantic
Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328 (1990), the Court held that a dealer did not
suffer "antitrust injury" when it incurred lost profits due to a competing dealer's adherence
to a maximum rpm agreement, so long as the prices fixed by the agreement were not
predatory. See id. at 339-46. ARCO's application of the "antitrust injury" requirement, par-
ticularly its focus on whether the prices set by the scheme were predatory, could have been
read to suggest that the Court no longer considered the limitation on trader freedom
caused by maximum rpm of independent consequence under the antitrust laws. Still, the
plaintiff in ARCO was not a party to the agreement in question, and other language in the
opinion suggested that a dealer constrained by such an agreement could suffer antitrust
injury, even if the agreement did not fix predatory prices. See id. at 345 ("If [maximum
rpm] causes the anticompetitive consequences detailed in Albrecht consumers and the man-
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Adherence to Albrechts normative vision would seem to require con-
demnation of this variety of forward integration as monopolistic." 0
Khan, on the other hand, suggests the opposite, opining that a maxi-
mum rpm scheme that reduces prices so much as to harm inefficient
dealers is still "not necessarily harmful to competition and consum-
ers.""' Thus, in asserting that the Albrecht rule encourages forward
integration, Khan apparently rejected sub silentio Albrecht's normative
preference for dealers over consumers.
III
AVOIDING THE QUESTION: THE COURT'S CONTINUING
AMBIVALENCE TOwARD TRADER FREEDOM
Despite its implicit rejection of Albrecht's normative vision, Khan
does not rule out a subsequent embrace of trader freedom in other
doctrinal contexts. After all, the Court purported to assume that
trader freedom was a relevant consideration and thus, unlike Sylvania,
cannot be cited as rejecting it outright. Moreover, Khan arguably re-
jects Sylvania's dictum. At the least, the Court retains maximum flexi-
bility in determining the significance of trader freedom, maintaining
for instance, the option to reaffirm those decisions that depend upon
concerns over the autonomy of traders and others. By saying one
thing while doing another, the Court has ensured that the role of
trader freedom in antitrust policy will remain in a state of flux.
This state of affairs should not continue indefinitely. To be pre-
cise, the resolution of numerous pending doctrinal questions should
require the Court to confront directly the normative question it
avoided in Khan. For instance, several scholars, including some on
whom the Khan Court relied, have advocated a rule of per se legality
for various vertical restraints, such as maximum rpm.112 Such treat-
ment, of course, is only appropriate if the practice in question never-
ufacturers' own dealers may bring suit." (second emphasis added)); Roger D. Blair &John E.
Lopatka, TheAlbrecht Rule After Khan: Death Becomes Her, 74 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 123, 136-
37 (1998).
110 See, e.g., Industrial Bldg. Materials, Inc. v. Interchemical Corp., 437 F.2d 1336, 1342-
43 (9th Cir. 1970) (finding a manufacturer's efficiency-based forward integration an abuse
of monopoly power).
Ill Khan, 118 S. Ct. at 283 (emphasis added).
112 See, e.g., 8 AREEDA, supra note 81, 1638b, at 419-20 (arguing that maximum rpm
should be lawful unless (1) the "maximum" is really a minimum or (2) the manufacturer is
engaged in predatory pricing-both independent violations of the Sherman Act); Bork,
supra note 28, at 181-82 (concluding that "antitrust should have no concern with vertical
restraints; all should be lawful"); Easterbrook, supra note 28, at 887 (arguing that "maxi-
mum price fixing is almost always beneficial"); Richard A. Posner, The Next Step in the Anti-
trust Treatment of Restricted Distribution: Per Se Legality, 48 U. CH. L. REV. 6 (1981) (arguing
that resale price maintenance agreements should be per se lawful).
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or almost never-has any negative consequences." 3 Yet if trader free-
dom is of significant value to antitrust doctrine, any vertical restraint
will have "negative consequences." Thus, Rule of Reason scrutiny, not
per se legality, is the most appropriate treatment. If, on the other
hand, the Court jettisons trader freedom, per se legality is more likely
appropriate. This is not to say that a determination whether a prac-
tice is per se lawful necessarily will require a choice between competing
normative visions. While the adoption of a rule of per se legality logi-
cally would require the rejection of trader freedom, the Court could
embrace a Rule of Reason standard without choosing between traders
and consumers. More precisely, the Court could determine that a
particular class of restraint poses a threat to consumers sufficient to
avoid per se legality, regardless of whether trader freedom is a cogniza-
ble value under the Sherman Act.
Even if the Court rejects rules of per se legality without embracing
trader freedom, the content of any Rule of Reason analysis for vertical
restraints will depend upon the normative role that the Court assigns
to this value. If the Court embraces trader freedom, any contractual
restraint would be deemed to produce an anticompetitive effect, to be
weighed-in one way or another-against the restraint's benefits. If,
on the other hand, the Court repudiates trader freedom, it would en-
sure a purely economic analysis. Take as an example the law gov-
erning exclusive territories. According to scholars who see consumers
as the sole beneficiaries of antitrust, proof that such a restraint will
lead to higher prices should be a necessary condition for liability
under the Rule of Reason." 4 Adopting trader freedom as an opera-
tive goal of antitrust, however, would require a different mode of anal-
ysis. Courts could hold, for instance, that the existence of the
restraint ipso facto establishes a prima facie case, thus shifting the bur-
den of justification to the proponent of the restraint." 5
Although it appears that the Court will have to determine explic-
itly whether trader freedom merits normative significance under the
antitrust laws, history suggests that it will not do so any time soon.
Despite its declining docket, the Court, in the two decades since Sylva-
nia, has avoided any case that would require it to elaborate on the
113 See Frank H. Easterbrook, Comparative Advantage and Antitrust Law, 75 CAL. L. Rxv.
983, 987 (1987) (deeming per se legality appropriate if 80% of the conduct in question is
"beneficial"); Herbert Hovenkamp, Chicago and Its Alternatives, 1986 DuKE LJ. 1014, 1020-
21 ("Per se legality is appropriate only if we can be relatively sure that every instance of
[the restraint in question] is competitively harmless.").
114 See William F. Baxter, The Viability of Vertical Restraints Doctrine, 75 CAL. L. REV. 933,
948-49 (1987); Easterbrook, supra note 67, at 135.
115 This position, it should be noted, is taken by many of those in the so-called Populist
school of antitrust. See, e.g., Ross, supra note 31, at 242-46 & n.51; Bohling, supra note 29,
at 513-15; Flynn, supra note 29, at 1143-46.
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content of Rule of Reason analysis. As a result, lower courts have as-
sumed the responsibility of dealing with this normative question. In-
deed, the Khan Court continued this practice, remanding the case for
a Rule of Reason analysis without indicating whether the lower court
should include in its calculus the restraint's effect on trader free-
dom." 6 The lower courts, in tarn, have refused to accord any norma-
tive significance to trader freedom." 7 This tendency to refrain from
articulating antitrust policy extends beyond vertical restraints and is,
in fact, part of a larger pattern. For instance, the Court has heard
only two merger cases since 1974, neither of which dealt directly with
the substantive law of mergers." 8 In each case, the Court narrowed
the class of private parties who may challenge mergers, with the result
that the Government now brings nearly all such actions. 9 As it has
done with vertical restraints, the Court has left the difficult questions
to other actors who have refused to accord trader freedom any
significance. 120
IV
BALANCING LEGTMACY AGAINST COHERENCE IN A WORLD
OF CHANGING THEORY
A. Maintaining Appearances: The Court's Refusal to Choose
Between Traders and Consumers in Khan
More cynical observers may perceive Khan as part of a less-than-
candid campaign slowly and silently to excise trader freedom as a rele-
vant concern of antitrust regulation. By resting its decision solely
upon economic theory, the Court arguably has avoided accountability
for its choice to repudiate Albrecht's normative vision. Moreover, if its
116 See Khan, 118 S. Ct. at 285.
117 Instead, these courts have uniformly held that to state a prima facie case under the
Rule of Reason, plaintiffs challenging vertical restraints must show that the agreement will
lead to higher prices for consumers. See Douglas H. Ginsburg, Vertical Restraints: De Facto
Legality Under the Rule of Reason, 60 AurTrusT LJ. 67, 71-73 (1991) (concluding that plain-
tiffs only have prevailed in cases in which they were able to establish the existence of an-
ticompetitive effects, namely, a reduction in intrabrand competition that led to higher
prices).
118 See Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104 (1986); Brunswick Corp. v.
Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
119 See Joseph F. Brodiley, Antitrust Standing in Private Merger Cases: Reconciling Private
Incentive and Public Enforcement Goals, 94 MICH. L. REv. 1, 9-10, 45 (1995) (observing that
recent changes in standing doctrine have shifted merger enforcement responsibility to
government actors).
120 See 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines for Department of Justice and Federal
Trade Commission, 57 Fed. Reg. 41,552 (1992) (promulgating standards governing en-
forcement agencies' decisions to challenge mergers). In defining its overall objectives, the
Guidelines note that "the Agency seeks to avoid unnecessary interference with the larger
universe of mergers that are either competitively beneficial or neutral." Id. at 41,553 (em-
phasis added).
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treatment of merger law and nonprice restraints is any indication, the
Court will leave the content of Rule of Reason analysis to the lower
courts, ensuring that trader freedom plays no role in the regulation of
maximum rpm. If this cynical view is accurate, it may be only a matter
of time before the Court altogether abandons trader freedom as a
value in antitrust analysis. Just as prior Courts employed economic
theory to justify decisions that enhanced trader freedom, the Khan
Court has used new theory to mask its repudiation of this value.
A different diagnosis of the problem, however, assigns an alterna-
tive role to economic theory and suggests a different fate for trader
freedom, at least in the short run. This diagnosis begins with a com-
monplace observation: judges are acutely sensitive to the appearance
that they are making law rather than expounding it. Without the
purse, sword, or democratically derived legitimacy, the Court must de-
pend upon public esteem for the implementation of its decisions.12'
This esteem, in turn, depends upon the public's belief that the Jus-
tices are engaged in a legal enterprise and not a political one.122
When judges step outside their assigned role and appear to act politi-
cally, they incur costs-what one scholar has called "illegitimacy
costs."' 23 All else being equal, judges will make decisions in a manner
that avoids the appearance of formulating policy and thereby mini-
mizes illegitimacy costs. 124
121 See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 267 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("The
Court's authority-possessed of neither the purse nor the sword-ultimately rests on sus-
tained public confidence in its moral sanction."); United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 223
(1882); JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL PoLiTIcAL PROCESS 139
(1980) ("The fortress ofjudicial review stands or falls with public opinion and the Court's
symbolic image .... .").
122 SeeJan G. Deutsch, Neutrality, Legitimacy, and the Supreme Court: Some Intersections Be-
tween Law and Political Science, 20 STAN. L. REv. 169, 236-40 (1968); see also Baker, 369 U.S. at
267 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("[Respect for the Court's judgments] must be nourished
by the Court's complete detachment, in fact and in appearance, from political entangle-
ments and by abstention from injecting itself into the clash of political forces in political
settlements."); THURMON W. ARNOLD, THE SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT 49 (1935) ("An official
admission by a judicial institution that it was moving in all directions at once in order to
satisfy the conflicting emotional values of the people which it served would be
unthinkable.").
123 Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity and Constraint, 65 FoRDHAM L. RFv. 1365, 1387 (1997); see
also Deutsch, supra note 122, at 237-39 (arguing that the Court has a "symbolic function"
that requires it to act and speak like a purely legal institution); Kauper, supra note 16, at
335-36 (arguing that the Court's failure to articulate the true basis for antitrust decisions
produced "an increasing cynicism about its methods and results which threatens ... ulti-
mately to jeopardize acceptance of its commands").
124 See Steven G. Calabresi, The Tradition of the Written Constitution: A Comment on Profes-
sorLessig's Theory of Translation, 65 FoRDHAM L. REv. 1435, 1454-55 (1997) ("Supreme Court
Justices and other federal judges always try to justify their decisions by writing opinions that
appeal to the constitutional text, to history, and to prior caselaw. Such appeals are what
the Justices' employers-the American people-expect from their Court."); Lawrence Les-
sig, Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47 STAN. L. REv. 395, 426-42 (1995).
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Against this backdrop, one easily can understand why the Khan
Court declined to pursue "trader freedom" seriously. The Justices un-
doubtedly realized that protection of such freedom would come with
a price-literally-to be paid by consumers. Recognition of trader
freedom as a relevant factor, then, would have begged the question of
whether the freedom that Albrecht protected is worth the accompany-
ing cost that consumers must bear. By refusing to accord trader free-
dom any independent weight, the Court avoided the prospect of
balancing trader freedom against consumer welfare, an enterprise
that inevitably would have cast the Justices in a policy-making role.
Of course, these same considerations operated on the Court in
Albrecht and other decisions in the trader freedom era, and yet the
Court, as we have seen, did engage in such trade offs. However, judi-
cial ideology to one side, at least two interrelated factors must account
for the current Court's stance toward trader freedom. First, for rea-
sons wholly external to antitrust law, economic theory, and trader
freedom, the notion of "balancing" one value against another now
stands in far less repute.125 In 1968, a mainstream antitrust scholar
could ask the Court to weigh openly trader freedom against consumer
welfare, without even hinting that such balancing might be inconsis-
tent with the judicial function.126 The Court's candor was all that mat-
tered.'2 7 Today, should the Court balance one value against
another-particularly values as incommensurable as trader freedom
and consumer welfare-it almost certainly will subject itself to charges
that it improperly has assumed a legislative function. 128 Indeed, the
Court expressly has recognized as much, sometimes rejecting invita-
tions to engage in balancing for this very reason.129 While the current
Court may be no more or less concerned about the appearance of
125 See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J.
943 (1987) (tracing the rise and spread of balancing and offering a critique).
126 See Kauper, supra note 16, at 330-34.
127 See id. at 335-36 (arguing that the Court's lack of candor had resulted in "increasing
cynicism about its methods" thus "impairing the credibility of the judicial process").
128 See, e.g., Aleinikoff, supra note 125, at 972-76, 984-86; Paul W. Kahn, The Court, the
Community and the Judicial Balance: The Jurisprudence of Justice Powell, 97 YALE L.J. 1, 56-59
(1987); Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. Ci. L. Rav. 1175 (1989); see
also Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 897 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in judgment) (chiding the Court for balancing incommensurate values be-
cause such an approach "is more like judging whether a particular line is longer than a
particular rock is heavy").
129 See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 527-28 (1996) (Thomas,
J., concurring) (criticizing the balancing test governing regulation of commercial speech
as an "inherently nondeterminate" standard that required courts to "weigh incommen-
surables" such that "individual judicial preferences will govern application of the test");
Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 889 n.5 (1990) ("[I]t is horrible to contemplate
that federaljudges will regularly balance against the importance of general laws the signifi-
cance of religious practice.").
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acting in a political manner, balancing, which once seemed judicial,
now appears political.
Second, advances in economic thinking have made the existence
of such balancing more apparent. While the advances in economic
theory that undermined the inhospitality tradition did not ipso facto
undermine Albrecht, they nonetheless did emphasize and elaborate on
the nature and extent of the trade off between dealers and consumers
that Albrecht entailed. As a result, the Khan Court could no longer
legitimately assert that it could protect dealers without really harming
consumers.18 0 Indeed, one even could say that these advances raised
the possibility that Albrecht struck the balance incorrectly. Adherence
to trader freedom, then, necessarily would have required the Court to
balance dealers against consumers anew, and to do so in a much more
explicit manner. Such an overt rebalancing would have required the
Court to incur higher illegitimacy costs than those that had accompa-
nied Albrecht.
One finds an analogy in, of all places, administrative law. For
nearly two centuries, the Court was generally willing to second guess
agency interpretations of statutes, purporting to "find" or "locate" the
law by discerning congressional intent. Eventually, however, legal cul-
ture came to see the enterprise of interpretation as an exercise injudi-
cial policy making, at least when the underlying statute was
ambiguous. 13' This realization led the Court to abandon its willing-
ness to review agency interpretations de novo on the grounds that
such second-guessing would require the Court to resolve "competing
political interests.' 3 2
130 Cf Baker & Blumenthal, supra note 17, at 331-32 (asserting that during the 1970s
and 1980s, new economic learning demonstrated that "ideologies of various stripes could
not all be satisfied simultaneously [and that p1opulist objectives could be attained only at
the sacrifice of economic objectives").
131 See RichardJ. Pierce, Jr., Chevron and Its Aftermath:Judicial Review of Agency Interpre-
tations of Statutory Provisions, 41 VAND. L. RFv. 301, 305 (1988) ("When a court 'interprets'
imprecise, ambiguous, or conflicting statutory language in a particular manner, the court
is resolving a policy issue."); Antonin Scalia, Rulemaking as Politics, 34 ADMIN. L. REv. v, v-vi
(Summer 1982) (admonishing agencies to make decisions that are "manifestations of the
popular will through the political process" and not based on "goals no more specific than
'the public interest, convenience and necessity'"); see also Lessig, supra note 124, at 436-38
(discussing Chevron and how, after this decision, "a federal court must defer to an agency
interpretation of [an] ambiguous [statutory] provision").
132 Chevron U.SA., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 865-66
(1984); see also Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969,
978-79 (1992) ("[TI he most apparent objective [of Chevron] was to maximize the role of
democratically accountable institutions in the process of legal interpretation and to restrict
the discretion of unelected courts."). A portion of the Chevron Court's language is worth
quoting here:
Judges are not experts in the field, and are not part of either political
branch of the Government. Courts must, in some cases, reconcile compet-
ing political interests, but not on the basis of the judges' personal policy
preferences. In contrast, an agency to which Congress has delegated poli-
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Similar considerations were apparently at work in the evolution
from Albrecht to Khan. Just as changes in legal culture led the Justices
to view the interpretation of ambiguous statutes as a political enter-
prise, advances in economic theory led the Court to believe that pro-
tection of trader freedom would require it to make inherently political
trade offs. 133 By overruling Albrecht and returning the question to the
lower courts, the Court avoided the institutional cost associated with
balancing incommensurable values.
This is not to suggest that the Court has embraced, sub silentio,
Sylvania's dictum asserting that an antitrust policy giving credence to
trader freedom would "lack any objective benchmarks" and thus
should be disfavored.' 34 Perhaps some Justices, maybe even a major-
ity, ultimately would agree with this dictum and the "consumer wel-
fare" standard it implies. On the other hand, it seems possible that
some Justices who joined the unanimous Khan opinion would reject
Sylvania's dictum out of support for trader freedom, a commitment to
balancing, or both. 3 5 Still, even aJustice who is personally enthusias-
tic about the enterprise of balancing traders against consumers pre-
sumably understands that such a course is costly--within today's legal
culture anyway-and should be avoided if possible. Thus, while Sylva-
nia's dictum may not reflect the substantive position of all the Justices,
it may be suggestive of the sort of incentives that influence their
behavior.
Of course, courts regularly engage in the enterprise of balancing.
For instance, they weigh the value of potential life against a mother's
right to choose an abortion.'3 6 They also regularly balance the com-
munity's right to safety against the individual's expectation of pri-
vacy.'3 7 Yet the analysis offered here did not begin with the premise
cymaking responsibilities may, within the limits of that delegation, properly
rely upon the incumbent administration's views of wise policy to inform its
judgments. While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the
Chief Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of
the Government to make such policy choices-resolving the competing in-
terests which Congress itself... did not resolve ....
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865.
133 Cf AREEDA & HovFNxKssp, supra note 33, 1 111-13 (arguing that the Court should
not, absent clear evidence to the contrary, impute to Congress a desire to empowerjudges
to balance consumer welfare against other values); BoR, supra note 33, at 79-89 (arguing
that consideration of values other than consumer welfare in the development of antitrust
doctrine would require the Court to engage in trade offs involving social and political
questions, a process that would be inconsistent with the judicial function).
134 Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 53 n.21 (1977).
135 See, e.g., John Paul Stevens, The Third Branch of Liberty, 41 U. Mimiut L. REV. 277, 280
(1986) (arguing that the Sherman Act should be interpreted "as a charter of freedom
because it is designed to enlarge the opportunity for independent decision making" (inter-
nal quotation marks and footnote omitted)).
136 See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
137 See Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408 (1997).
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that illegitimacy costs are prohibitive-only that they are present-
and will be dispositive other things being equal However, other things
are not always equal. It is one thing occasionally to leave antitrust
policy to the lower courts or the Department ofJustice. On the other
hand, when constitutional questions are involved, the Court's self-im-
age as expositor of particular constitutional values no doubt comes
into play, steeling it against illegitimacy costs that may flow from bal-
ancing.138 By avoiding the appearance of political decision making in
Khan, the Court preserved its political capital for those instances in
which it cares to act.1 39
If this account makes sense, one may justifiably ask why the Court
simply did not explicitly abandon trader freedom altogether. Two in-
terrelated considerations may explain the Court's failure to do so.
First, an open acknowledgment by the Court that it is aware of polit-
ical costs may itself entail some costs-imagine the Justices writing "we
hereby overrule Albrecht because adherence to that decision would en-
tail a high reputational cost." Thus, the only practical means of excis-
ing trader freedom from the law would be to question directly
Albrechts normative premises, that is, to overrule Albrecht by asserting
that consumer welfare is the sole standard by which the Court will
measure trade restraints. Such a direct repudiation of the Court's
prior normative vision, not based on any intervening events other
than changes in the Court's membership, would appear political and
thus entail illegitimacy costs of its own.140
138 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 864-69 (describing the Court's rather ex-
pansive vision of its role in the articulation of constitutional values); John 0. McGinnis,
Constitutional Review by the Executive in Foreign Affairs and War Powers: A Consequence of Ra-
tional Choice, LAW & CoNTEMP. PROB., Autumn 1993, at 293, 306-307 & nn.66-67 (asserting
that the Court has staked out individual rights as its special preserve while ceding authority
over other constitutional questions to the political branches).
139 See CHOPER, supra note 121, at 164-70 (arguing that the Court should preserve its
political capital by deferring to other branches of government in all but individual rights
cases).
140 See Deborah Hellman, The Importance of Appearing Principled, 37 Aiuz. L. REv. 1107
(1995) (describing the illegitimacy costs that courts incur when they overrule precedents
for apparently political reasons); Lessig, supra note 123, at 1391-92. Various Justices have
recognized these costs, albeit often in dissent. For example, according to Justice Stewart:
A basic change in the law upon a ground no firmer than a change in
our membership invites the popular misconception that this institution is
littie different from the two political branches of the Government. No mis-
conception could do more lasting injury to this Court and to the system of
law which it is our abiding mission to serve.
Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 636 (1974) (Stewart, J., dissenting); see also
Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 864 ("To overrule prior law for no other reason than mere
disagreement with it would run counter to the view repeated in our cases, that a decision to
overrule should rest on some special reason over and above the belief that a prior case was
wrongly decided."); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 677 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("It
certainly has never been a postulate of judicial power that mere altered disposition, or
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Second, suggesting that priorJustices fundamentally had misread
the antitrust laws would call the Court's own competence into ques-
tion.141 Even Justices who would reject a role for trader freedom in
antitrust doctrine as an original matter may find it costly to discard
explicitly this value and the precedents it supports. Not surprisingly,
therefore, the Khzan Court chose to clothe its decision in the garb of
positive economics. It costs far less for the Court to say "our predeces-
sors did their best, given the economics of the time" than to say "our
predecessors did not understand what the antitrust laws are all about."
The Khan Court, then, was between the proverbial rock and a
hard place. Any endorsement of trader freedom could not be con-
fined to the context of maximum rpm. As a result, reaffinnation of
Albrecht would have left the Court continually balancing trader free-
dom against consumer welfare in a variety of doctrinal settings-an
apparently political task with the accompanying reputational costs.
Explicit repudiation of Albrecht's normative premises, on the other
hand, itself would have entailed a significant cost.
By seeking refuge in the objectivity of economic theory and by
focusing only on the effect maximum rpm might have on consumers,
the Court avoided these two unsavory alternatives while appearing
simply to implement the conclusions of neutral experts. To be sure,
this course is not without cost. More perceptive observers will recog-
nize that changes in economic theory did not by themselves justify the
repudiation of Albrecht. When forced to choose between candor and
the appearance of legitimacy, the Court understandably chose the
latter.
The course taken in Khan was not entirely inevitable. To be sure,
the Court could only avoid the appearance of political behavior by
refusing to stake out a clear, consistent position regarding the role of
trader freedom. The apparently political nature of a decision to speak
vaguely, however, was not a given. Instead, this choice was a function
of the current state of (highly contested) discourse within the acad-
emy and elsewhere regarding the normative vision Congress meant to
incorporate within the antitrust laws.14 2 At one time, perhaps, a suffi-
ciently strong consensus existed that Congress designed the antitrust
laws to protect trader freedom at the expense of consumers.' 43 Even
absent such a consensus, the Albrecht Court credibly could claim,
subsequent membership on the Court, is sufficient warrant for overturning a deliberately
decided rule of Constitutional law.").
141 See Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 866 ("There is a limit to the amount of error that
can plausibly be imputed to prior Courts.").
142 Cf Lessig, supra note 123, at 412 (observing that discourses are not permanently or
naturally "contested" or "uncontested").
143 See supra notes 12-13 (collecting authorities from trader freedom era concluding
that antitrust laws were designed to protect traders at the expense of consumers).
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based on the dominant economic paradigm of the time, that traders
could be protected without harming consumers.'4 However, the rela-
tively recent realization associated with advances in economic the-
ory-that the protection of traders often occurs at the expense of
consumers-has led many scholars to question whether Congress in
fact contemplated such a trade off. As a result, any possible consensus
suggesting that the antitrust laws empower the Court to engage in
such trade offs has long since evaporated. 145 Absent the emergence of
a new scholarly consensus regarding antitrust's normative founda-
tions, the Court's reticence to speak in a clear normative voice likely
will continue. 146
B. A Poor Prognosis: Legitimacy and the Continuing
Incoherence of Antitrust Doctrine
This Essay's analysis, it is submitted, explains the course taken in
Khan. Further, unlike claims that the Court quietly has chosen to em-
brace consumer welfare, the present analysis explains the Court's re-
luctance to speak plainly about its normative premises in other
doctrinal contexts, as well as its continued adherence to certain prece-
dents premised upon trader freedom. 147 Some such precedents, after
all, involve little or no obvious cost to consumers, at least as economic
theory now stands. Even if economic theory demonstrates that these
decisions bar only innocuous conduct, adherence to them entails few
if any trade offs and correspondingly minor illegitimacy costs, while
repudiation of them would require the Court to question directly its
prior normative vision.
The Court's stubborn adherence to the per se rule against tying
agreements provides an example of this phenomenon. 48 Although
premised upon a concern for trader freedom, the prohibition of con-
tracts "forcing" a buyer to purchase (unwanted) tied products inflicts
no obvious harm on consumers, at least when analyzed with the eco-
nomic models applied by the Court.149 These models simply demon-
strate that such contracts are not always harmful; they do not
144 See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text.
145 See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text (describing debate between "trader
freedom" and "consumer welfare" schools).
146 See Easterbrook, supra note 33, at 714 (suggesting that such a consensus cannot be
reached).
147 See supra notes 35-42 (describing the Court's refusal to abandon various precedents
premised upon a concern for trader freedom).
148 See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 461-79 (1992)
(applying per serule to tying arrangements);Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466
U.S. 2, 12-15 (1984) (rejecting challenge to per se nile).
149 See Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 12-15 (holding that proof that seller imposing tie
possesses market power establishes that tie has been "forced" on consumers and is per se
illegal).
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demonstrate that tying contracts usually or sometimes benefit con-
sumers.150 Adherence to this precedent, then, involves no apparent
balancing of traders against consumers and thus no illegitimacy costs.
Rejection of it, on the other hand, would seem political.
This Essay's analysis suggests that this pattern is likely to continue.
That is, the Court's adherence to precedents premised on trader free-
dom will vary inversely with the illegitimacy costs that such adherence
will entail. The Court will continue to narrow or overrule those prece-
dents that would require the Court to sacrifice obvious benefits to
consumers. It seems unlikely, however, that the Court, in the course
of overruling these decisions, will speak directly to their normative
premises. More plausibly, one would expect the Court to follow the
course taken in Khan and assert that the economic premises underly-
ing prior decisions have proven false.151 For instance, one might ex-
pect the Court to abandon the per se rule against horizontal maximum
price fixing 52 without questioning the law's commitment to trader
freedom. Similarly, the Court could relax precedents hostile to con-
sumer-friendly mergers by relying upon the greater appreciation in
the economics profession and elsewhere of the beneficial effects of
such transactions.153
The Court will not, however, entirely expunge trader freedom
from the case law. As noted above, some precedents that rest on this
value present no obvious harm to consumers. Take, for example, the
law regarding group boycotts. Those who see no place for trader free-
dom in antitrust law would require a showing of economic harm
before condemning such arrangements. 54 Current law, however, for-
bids such boycotts when they are imposed by firms with market power
and unaccompanied by any integration.155 Unlike a per se rule against
maximum rpm, the per se rule against certain group boycotts does no
150 See Meese, supra note 9, at 44-49 (contending that the dominant critique of tying
doctrine depends upon the assertion that such contracts are rarely harmful, without any
corresponding showing that they produce consumer benefits); see also i&. at 48-49 (showing
that briefs before the Court in Jefferson Parish barely mentioned the possible benefits of
tying contracts).
151 Cf. Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 219-30
(1993) (narrowing Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685 (1967), in light of
revised understandings of the feasibility of predatory pricing).
152 See Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 354 (1982).
153 For instance, the Court could agree with those lower courts that have suggested
that efficiencies willjustify an otherwise anticompetitive merger. See, e.g., FTC v. University
Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206, 1222-23 (11th Cir. 1991); see also Williamson, supra note 56, at
272-73 (describing increased appreciation in the economics profession for the benefits of
mergers).
154 See, e.g., RICHARD A. PosNER, ANTIrrRUTr LAw: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECIVE 207-11
(1976).
155 See Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 472
U.S. 284, 298 (1985).
1999]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
apparent harm to consumers. As a result, adherence to a per se rule
would involve no balancing of consumers against traders and thus en-
tail no illegitimacy costs. Therefore, the analysis offered here would
predict that the Court would adhere to the current rule, even though
it forbids conduct that is unlikely to result in economic harm. 156
Friends and foes of trader freedom will surely find the prognosis
this Essay has offered disheartening. It should be emphasized, how-
ever, that the state of affairs it has described is not permanent. For
instance, to the extent that advocates can highlight for the Court just
how precedents that protect traders harm consumers, they effectively
can raise the illegitimacy costs of adhering to such decisions.157
Also, as noted earlier, the Court's current reluctance to espouse a
clear, consistent position regarding the role of trader freedom reflects
its unwillingness to engage in conduct that may appear political.158 If
all or nearly all of the scholars and lawyers concerned with antitrust
shared a particular account of the original meaning of the Sherman
Act, the Court explicitly could embrace or repudiate trader free-
dom.159 However, no such uniformity of vision exists, and this lack of
consensus ensures that the Court will face the charge of acting in a
political manner regardless of the normative vision it ultimately
embraces.
There is, it should be noted, a significant irony in the position in
which the Court has placed itself. In attempting to minimize the ap-
pearance of politicized decision making, the Justices have abjured any
unifying standard, such as consumer welfare, to inform antitrust doc-
trine. The result has been and apparently will be ajurisprudence that
treats similar cases very differently. Consider, for instance, the plight
of a franchisor that possesses market power. Under Khan, a franchisor
can prohibit opportunistic price gouging by its dealers through a
price ceiling agreement, subject only to Rule of Reason scrutiny.160
However, the same franchisor cannot employ tying contracts to pre-
156 Of course, the fact that an agreement does not have anticompetitive effects sug-
gests that it produces efficiencies that benefit consumers and others. SeePolk Bros., Inc. v.
Forest City Enters., 776 F.2d 185, 191 (7th Cir. 1985) (Easterbrook, J.); I AREEDA &
Hovi'mEi, supra note 33, 111, at 113 ("[E]fficiency gains are a probable explanation
for conduct that promises no gain from reduced competition."). The mere fact that a
contract produces such benefits, however, does guarantee that the benefits will be appar-
ent, or that the courts will recognize them as such. Absent such recognition, courts that
adhere to rules voiding such agreements will suffer no illegitimacy costs.
157 Thus, convincing the Court that, for example, tying contracts can yield significant
consumer benefits may induce it to abandon the per se rule against such agreements. See
Meese, supra note 9, at 59-66 (describing benefits of tying contracts).
158 See supra Part IV.A.
159 See Bork, supra note 28, at 173 (suggesting that, in deciding antitrust cases, the
Court "must pay attention to its constituencies").
160 See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text (describing how maximum rpm can
deter dealer opportunism).
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vent opportunistic reductions in quality.' 6 ' Similarly, manufacturers
can freely combat dealer free riding by granting and enforcing air-
tight exclusive territories. 62 Yet, should a manufacturer allow several
dealers to exploit the same territory and set minimum prices to pre-
vent free riding, it may find itself paying treble damages or facing in-
dictment.163 By avoiding the appearance of politicized decision
making on a case-by-case basis, the Justices have developed ajurispru-
dence that, taken as a whole, simply does not treat like cases alike.
Faced with the choice between doctrinal consistency and the enhance-
ment of its own stature, the Court has chosen the latter course.
CONCLUSION
Economics can and should play an important role in the develop-
ment of antitrust doctrine. Whether it should play an exclusive role
poses a much more difficult question, on which there is no consensus
in sight. So long as the protection of traders appears to injure con-
sumers, the Justices will neglect the value of trader freedom in favor of
consumer-friendly decisions. However, when the Justices can preserve
trader freedom without apparent consumer harm, decisions premised
upon the protection of this value likely will survive. Legitimacy in ju-
dicial decision making, it seems, will come at the price of doctrinal
incoherence.
161 SeeJefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 12-15 (1984) (holding
tying contracts obtained by firms with market power per se unlawful); Alan J. Meese, Anti-
trust Balancing in a (Near) Coasean World: The Case of Franchise Tying Contracts, 95 MICH. L.
REv. 111, 117-121 (1996) (describing how tying contracts can prevent franchisee opportu-
nism). See generally Arthur, supra note 104, at 64-68 (describing similarities between tying
and other intrabrand vertical restraints).
162 See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 57-59 (1977) (stating
that exclusive territories should be analyzed under the Rule of Reason); supra notes 116-17
and accompanying text (describing Rule of Reason case law sympathetic to exclusive
territories).
163 See Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 724-27 (1988) (reiter-
ating the per se rule against minimum rpm); Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 51 n.18 (rejecting asser-
tion that rationale for overruling Schwinn also required repudiation of per se rule against
minimum rpm).
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